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INNOCENT UNTIL BORN: WHY PRISONS SHOULD STOP 
SHACKLING PREGNANT WOMEN TO PROTECT THE 
CHILD 
MELANIE KALMANSON* 
ABSTRACT 
 The practice of American prisons to shackle and otherwise restrain incarcerated, preg-
nant women is problematic for several reasons. Such practices include shackling, chaining, 
and handcuffing pregnant inmates during their third trimester, transportation to and from 
medical facilities, labor and delivery, and postpartum recovery. Current discourse on this 
topic focuses primarily on how these practices invade the woman’s civil liberties, particularly 
the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and international hu-
man rights. Recent case law vindicates policy rationales for such practices—safety of others, 
safety of the woman herself, and securing flight risks.  
 These discussions overlook and this Note confronts the state’s interests in fetal rights 
and then, after birth, the child’s rights as a constitutionally protected person. Shifting the 
shackling discussion to protecting the child, this Note argues that shackling practices should 
be banned in all American institutions because they unconstitutionally infringe upon the 
child’s rights to due process and against cruel and unusual punishment. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Between 1977 and 2004, the number of incarcerated females in the 
United States increased by 757%,1 primarily as a result of “the so-
called war on drugs and related changes in legislation, law enforce-
ment practices, and judicial decision-making.”2 This increase was not 
a result of an upsurge in violence perpetrated by American women.  
 Increasing female prison3 populations heightens a related, gender-
specific concern: how the pregnant prison population is treated while 
incarcerated. In 2009, it was reported that, “at any given time, more 
than 10,000 pregnant women are” incarcerated.4 In other terms, a 
2013 report indicated that 6% of the incarcerated female population is 
pregnant.5 It is unclear whether this incarcerated, pregnant popula-
tion is comprised of women who enter prison pregnant6 or become 
                                                                                                               
 * J.D., Magna Cum Laude, Florida State University College of Law, 2016; B.S., Magna 
Cum Laude, Florida State University, 2013. Thank you to Professor Avlana Eisenberg for sup-
porting this project as part of her extremely insightful Prison Reform Seminar. Also, as my last 
Note of law school, thank you to all of my professors who contributed to my developing passion 
for academia—specifically Mary Ziegler, P. Mark Spottswood, and Courtney Cahill. 
 1. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU BRIEFING PAPER: THE SHACKLING OF PREGNANT 
WOMEN & GIRLS IN U.S. PRISONS, JAILS & YOUTH DETENTION CENTERS, at *1, 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_stand_alone.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9TSE-GP2L] [hereinafter ACLU BRIEFING PAPER]. 
 2. DOROTHY Q. THOMAS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, ALL 
TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 17 (1996). 
 3. A “[c]orrectional institution” is any facility that “has the power to detain or restrain, 
or both, a person under the laws of [its respective] state,” whether private or public. 55 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(4) (2016); accord FLA. STAT. 944.241(2)(a) (2012). For this dis-
cussion, ‘prison’ is used synonymously with this definition of a ‘correctional institution’ and 
implies no significant difference to a ‘jail’ or ‘detention center,’ or any other term to refer to 
a place in which those convicted of a crime are detained. 
 4. Diana Kasdan, Abortion Access for Incarcerated Women: Are Correctional Health 
Practices in Conflict with Constitutional Standards?, 41 VIEWPOINT 59, 59 (2009), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/4105909.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXQ3-9FN2]. 
 5. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC ET AL., THE SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED PREGNANT 
WOMEN: A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION COMMITTED REGULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 
(2013) [hereinafter SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN], https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/ 
sites/ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Report%20-%20Shackling%20of%20Pregnant% 
20Prisoners%20in%20the%20US.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TA7-AWFK]. 
 6. See EDNA WALKER CHANDLER, WOMEN IN PRISON 44 (1973) (“[M]any women come to 
prison pregnant. . . . During 1972 there were 227 babies born to women in the thirty prisons 
reporting.”); FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, ABORTION & REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH CARE FOR INCARCERATED WOMEN (2014) [hereinafter FAMILY  
PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH], http://docplayer.net/23552500-Policy-brief-abortion- 
reproductive-health-care-for-incarcerated-women.html [https://perma.cc/EBC9-LKAF] (“Approx-
imately six to 10 percent of women are already pregnant when they enter a prison or jail . . . .”). 
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pregnant in prison.7 Sexual abuse by prison guards has been an en-
demic issue in American prisons for decades,8 so it is possible that an 
inmate may become pregnant while incarcerated as a result of such 
abuse.9 On the other hand, recent legislative and executive focus on 
prosecuting pregnant women who use illegal substances or abuse legal 
substances would, of course, contribute to the increased pregnant 
prison population.10 Nevertheless, the number of pregnant women who 
are incarcerated in the United States is significant. 
 The problem is not that this population exists, but instead how preg-
nant women in American correctional institutions are treated—an es-
sentially barbaric practice. Women are being chained and shackled dur-
ing their third trimester, labor and delivery,11 and postpartum recov-
ery.12 States justify these practices as safety precautions for society, the 
authorities, and the woman herself. However, this Note dispels these 
alleged safety concerns and presents a new perspective on why these 
policies should be banned, as suggested by recent federal legislation.  
 Rather than focusing on the incarcerated mother’s rights,13 this 
Note shifts the focus to the fetus and, thereafter, child by applying (1) 
abortion jurisprudence when discussing the fetus and (2) constitu-
tional law and child custody principles to protect the child, once born. 
Based on the reasoning presented herein, each state should enact leg-
islation to ban the restraint—shackling, abdominal-chaining, and 
                                                                                                                  
 7. See FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6 (“[W]omen can 
become pregnant while incarcerated during private visits with their partners, home visits, 
while in work release programs . . . .”). Cf. Bill Mears, Supreme Court Allows Abortions for 
Inmates, CNN (Mar. 24, 2008, 9:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/24/scotus/ 
index.html?eref=rss_us [https://perma.cc/QUS3-6JLL] (“The inmate . . . found out she was 
pregnant just after she had been sentenced . . . to four months in the county jail for driving 
while intoxicated.” (emphasis added)). 
 8. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 2, at 38-45; 
IF/WHEN/HOW, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE IN THE PRISON SYSTEM 7 (2016), 
http://www.ifwhenhow.org/resources/reproductive-justice-in-the-prison-system/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LD5L-UY9M] [hereinafter IF/WHEN/HOW]. 
 9. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6 (“[W]omen can be-
come pregnant while incarcerated . . . as a result of sexual assault by staff.”). 
 10. See Mary Ziegler, Opinion, Everyone Agrees Women Who Have Abortions Shouldn’t 
Be Penalized. Or Do They?, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
posteverything/wp/2016/04/01/everyone-agrees-women-who-have-abortions-shouldnt-be-pe-
nalized-or-do-they/?utm_term=.b95f760e5a56 [https://perma.cc/P3PC-TLV2] (“The main-
stream antiabortion movement had also expanded fetal rights, backing the prosecutions of 
pregnant women who abused drugs or otherwise put pregnancies at risk.”). See generally 
Eileen D. Collins, To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: The Dilemma Posed by Pregnancy and 
Substance Abuse, 9 PUB. INT. L. REP. 23, 23 (2004). 
 11. See infra notes 44, 196-98 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (“As a consequence of their own 
actions, prisoners may be deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty.”). 
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handcuffing14—of incarcerated, pregnant women to protect the state’s 
interests in fetal life and safety and the child upon birth. Part II can-
vasses the current prison environment in which incarcerated, preg-
nant women live, including their limited access to abortion and the 
types of restraints that are applied to them during pregnancy. Part II 
also samples existing state legislation beginning this movement to-
wards reduced restraints but explains that it is unlikely these protec-
tions are being enforced. Part III juxtaposes abortion jurisprudence—
namely, doctrine from the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade15 and 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey16 and 
their progeny—to establish that the state has an interest in protecting 
the fetus being carried by an incarcerated, pregnant woman. Part III 
then argues that once the child is born, or the time-period shifts from 
the third trimester to labor and delivery, an independent, constitution-
ally protected individual exists, which requires banning restraints 
during labor and delivery. Part III also applies the statutory best in-
terests framework, which is at the center of child custody disputes, to 
emphasize how restraining a pregnant inmate undermines the state’s 
interest in protecting the child. Part IV recommends the enactment of 
nation-wide legislation mirroring policies purportedly applied by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons. 
II.   PREGNANT WOMEN IN THE CURRENT U.S. PRISON SYSTEM 
 That incarcerated women are shackled, chained, and handcuffed in 
prison during some of the most physically taxing times of their preg-
nancy is a reality of which many unimprisoned Americans are una-
ware.17 Yet, related topics like women’s access to reproductive care—
contraception,18 abortion,19 etc.—are mainstream issues. Disconnect 
                                                                                                               
 14. IF/WHEN/HOW, supra note 8, at 6. 
 15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 17. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the 
Age of Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 497, 501-02 (1994) (referring to a discon-
nect between society and what happens inside prisons). 
 18. E.g., Ziegler, supra note 10; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Burwell, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/roman-catholic-archbishop-of-
washington-v-burwell/ [https://perma.cc/R275-4JTH] (discussing a case pending currently 
before the U.S. Supreme Court addressing whether companies’ First Amendment rights are 
being violated by being forced to comply with the federal government mandate to provide 
contraception to employees, despite the religious beliefs of the owners against the  
practice); Smear Campaign Against Planned Parenthood, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/smear-campaign-against-planned-
parenthood [https://perma.cc/5LKX-VCH7] (detailing recent pushback against Planned 
Parenthood’s efforts to provide reproductive care to women, including legislative movements).  
 19. E.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (most recent case 
from the U.S. Supreme Court on abortion); see Mary Ziegler, Symposium: The Court Once 
Again Makes the “Undue-Burden” Test a Referendum on the Facts, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 
2017]  INNOCENT UNTIL BORN 855 
  
 
 
between prison and civic societies explains why, until recently, the 
maltreatment of pregnant, incarcerated women was generally unde-
tected and not addressed in legislation.20  
 This Part first explains the current environment in which pregnant 
women who are incarcerated live and the governmental rationale for 
the surrounding policies. It then samples related state legislation from 
across the country and summarizes recent efforts challenging shack-
ling practices on the basis of constitutional and international human 
rights. This informative Part sets the stage of the current discourse for 
the shift in discussion that Part III introduces. 
A.   How Incarceration Limits a Woman’s Access to Care 
 Women compose an increasing proportion of the American prison 
population;21 and, approximately 6% of the female prison population is 
pregnant.22 Pregnancy in prison is much different than being pregnant 
in ‘free’ society. When an incarcerated woman is pregnant, her options 
as to how her pregnancy will proceed are severely limited by her incar-
ceration and the prison facility’s resulting control over her medical 
care.23 In contrast, a ‘free’ woman may completely control her preg-
nancy, including whether the pregnancy will be carried to term, which 
doctor treats her, how and where she will give birth, how and where 
she will recover from labor and delivery, etc. 
 “An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his [or her] med-
ical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.”24 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it is “the government’s ob-
ligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incar-
ceration.”25 When medical care is denied, the result is, at least, “pain 
and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological pur-
pose.”26 At its worse, such denial of medical care could amount to a vio-
                                                                                                                  
2016, 2:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-the-court-once-again-
makes-the-undue-burden-test-a-referendum-on-the-facts/ [https://perma.cc/8MLM-UBUY]. 
 20. Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
237, 240 (2009); see, e.g., SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5; Sowle, supra 
note 17, at 501-02.  
 21. See Stav Ziv, Report: America’s Prison Population Is Growing Again, NEWSWEEK 
(Dec. 22, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/americas-correctional-system-numbers-
293583 [https://perma.cc/YR8W-7BSC]. 
 22. See SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5. 
 23. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510-11 (2011). 
 24. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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lation of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.27 Nonetheless, “[e]ach day, men, women, and children 
behind bars suffer needlessly from lack of access to adequate medical 
and mental health care. Chronic illnesses go untreated, emergencies are 
ignored, and patients with serious mental illness fail to receive neces-
sary care.”28 Pregnant women are among those inmates not receiving 
adequate medical care from American correctional institutions.29  
 More significantly, a woman’s pregnancy is altered by incarcera-
tion. For example, in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court established that 
women have a right to choose to have an abortion, protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 This holding of 
Roe v. Wade in 1973 was affirmed in 1992 by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.31 In 
2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment—
thereby tacitly assenting to or “let[ting] stand”—“a lower court’s ruling 
that female inmates have a constitutional right to abortions off jail 
grounds.”32 Thus, the fundamental right to choose to have an abortion, 
is not a right lost upon incarceration.33  
 Despite these constitutional protections, correctional institutions 
often limit, or sometimes altogether eliminate, a female inmate’s right 
                                                                                                               
 27. Id. at 103-04; Sara Baez, Student Argues Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated 
Women at Conference in Dominican Republic, MIAMI LAW (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.law.miami.edu/news/2016/june/student-argues-reproductive-rights-incarcerated- 
women-conference-dominican-republic [https://perma.cc/8U5S-URAW]; see U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII. 
 28. Medical and Mental Health Care, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights/medical-and-mental-health-care [https:// 
perma.cc/GB24-WDP7]; accord Medical Care for Prisoners, CTR. FOR PRISONER HEALTH & 
HUM. RIGHTS, http://www.prisonerhealth.org/resources-for-prisoners-families-and-advo-
cates/prisoners-and-families/ [https://perma.cc/PW8Z-L69U]. 
 29. See Vania Leveille, Bureau of Prisons Revises Policy on Shackling of Pregnant In-
mates, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 20, 2008), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/ 
bureau-prisons-revises-policy-shackling-pregnant-inmates [https://perma.cc/7AG6-3A9G]. 
 30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
 31. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
 32. Mears, supra note 7. That denying reproductive rights due to incarceration amounts 
to a violation of the Eighth Amendment is likely a compelling argument not presented here. 
See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510-11 (2011); Arpaio v. Doe, 552 U.S. 1280 (2008). 
 33. E.g., FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6; Complaint at 
2, Doe v. Singleton, No. 3:15-cv-01215-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 20, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint] 
(“[A] woman has a fundamental right to decide whether or not to bear a child. This right 
survives incarceration.”); see Arpaio, 552 U.S. at 1280; see also Brown, 563 U.S. at 510 
(“[T]he law and the Constitution demand recognition of certain other rights.”). But cf. James 
Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 21, 28-29 (2012) (listing the rights one does lose upon conviction—during incarcera-
tion and after release—such as the right to vote, the right to serve on a jury, and eligibility 
for welfare assistance). 
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to choose to terminate her pregnancy.34 In fact, “a significant propor-
tion of [correctional] facilities refuse to allow abortion access” to in-
mates.35 Even facilities that, in theory, allow inmates to choose an 
abortion fail to assist women in actually accessing abortions, further 
undermining the reality that incarcerated women can exercise their 
fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.36 As a result, 
incarcerated women are essentially forced to carry their pregnancies 
to term.37 One scholar, in particular, drawing from international hu-
man rights standards “argues that the denial of an abortion to an in-
carcerated woman should constitute torture and a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.”38 Justice Ginsburg’s 2016 concurrence in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt39 may also suggest an Eighth Amend-
ment violation from such denial due to the danger and possible com-
plications of childbirth that the state is thereby forcing upon incarcer-
ated women.40 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hellerstedt sug-
gested that abortion implicates “important human values.”41 That 
said, if a woman is pregnant, incarcerated, and obliged to carry her 
pregnancy to term, how is the state treating her during pregnancy and 
the fetus during gestation? 
                                                                                                                  
 34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
 35. Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59; accord, e.g., Complaint, supra note 33, at 2 (requesting 
relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as the Sheriff denied Plaintiff, a preg-
nant inmate, access to an abortion). 
 36. Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59; accord FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE 
RESEARCH, supra note 6. Officers’ ability to act depending on the specific case and their re-
lated personal feelings towards an inmate furthers the frustration of reproductive access  
for female inmates. Kimberly Goldberg, Pregnant Women and Mothers Behind Bars, 8  
L. & SOC’Y J. UCSB 125, 128 (2009). 
 37. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128 (explaining the story of how a combination of 
bureaucracy and state laws in Louisiana forced Victoria W. to carry her pregnancy to term); 
id. at 133 (“Women in prison need to be able to have the choice of an abortion readily available 
to them.”); Samantha Lachman, Alabama Moves to Deny Inmate Parental Rights So She 
Can’t Have Abortion, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/alabama-inmate-parental-rights-abortion_us_55b9056ee4b0224d8834ca9b [https:// 
perma.cc/A9NB-X3FC]. This is not elaborated on here; though, the denial of abortion to an 
inmate could likely amount to an infringement on an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights 
under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 38. Baez, supra note 27.  
 39. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 40. See also id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“When a State severely limits access 
to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed 
rogue practitioners, faute de mieux, at great risk to their health and safety.”). 
 41. Id. at 2305 (majority opinion) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, 
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1982)). 
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B.   Chained and Shackled by American Correctional Institutions 
 In addition to a general lack of medical care and severely re-
stricted access to abortion,42 pregnant inmates in U.S. correctional 
facilities are often physically restrained during the third trimester,43 
transportation to and from medical facilities, labor and delivery,44 
and postpartum recovery.45 Yet, “[a]t least two courts have held that 
pregnancy, at least in its later stages, constitutes a serious medical 
need,”46 indicating that medical care may not be denied to inmates 
under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.47In Illinois, the pioneer in 
anti-shackling legislation—as explained in Section 1 below—defines 
“restraints” as: 
[A]ny physical restraint or mechanical device used to control the 
movement of a prisoner’s body or limbs, or both, including, but not 
limited to, flex cuffs, soft restraints, hard metal handcuffs, a black 
box, Chubb cuffs, leg irons, belly chains, a security (tether) chain, or 
a convex shield, or shackles of any kind.48 
                                                                                                               
 42. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6 (reporting low rates 
of pregnancy care—prenatal exercise, nutrition counseling, medication, testing, etc.—for in-
mates). But cf. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 132 (“Many argue that because the majority of 
women in prison are poor, they are actually receiving better services for their pregnancy 
than they would outside of prison.”). 
 43. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5; Andrea Hsu, Difficult Births: 
Laboring and Delivering in Shackles, NPR (July 16, 2010, 3:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=128563037 [https://perma.cc/EW48-M5QW]. 
 44. AM. MED. ASS’N., AN “ACT TO PROHIBIT THE SHACKLING OF PREGNANT 
PRISONERS” MODEL STATE LEGISLATION (2015), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ 
default/files/media-browser/specialty%20group/arc/shackling-pregnant-prisoners-issue-brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2HVN-7X6F]; ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1. “Labor” is defined as: 
[T]he period of time before a birth and shall include any medical condition in which a woman 
is sent or brought to the hospital for the purpose of delivering her baby. These situations 
include: induction of labor, prodromal labor, pre-term labor, prelabor rupture of membranes, 
the 3 stages of active labor, uterine hemorrhage during the third trimester of pregnancy, and 
caesarian delivery including pre-operative preparation. 
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(2) (2016); accord FLA. STAT. § 944.241(2)(e) (2015). 
 45. AM. MED. ASS’N., supra note 44. “Post-partum” is defined by Illinois, for example, 
as “the period immediately following delivery, including the entire period a woman is in the 
hospital or infirmary after birth.” 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(3) (2016). Florida’s def-
inition is a bit more restrictive, defining “postpartum recovery” as: [T]he period immediately 
following delivery, including the recovery period when a woman is in the hospital or infir-
mary following birth, up to 24 hours after delivery unless the physician after consultation 
with the department or correctional institution recommends a longer period of time. 
FLA. STAT. § 944.241(2)(f) (2015) (emphasis added).  
 46. ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: 
MEDICAL, DENTAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 3, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ 
files/field_document/know_your_rights_--_medical_mental_health_and_dental_july_2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MVV7-WA8F]. 
 47. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
 48. 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6(a)(1) (2016). 
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Generally, when such policies exist without restrictive legislation, 
these restraints are used “regardless of [the woman’s] history of vio-
lence or escape,”49 meaning the practices are uniformly applied with-
out consideration of case-by-case necessity or appropriateness. This 
Section further explains existing shackling practices,50 the policy ra-
tionales supporting these practices, and current legislation aiming to 
reduce such practices—the effectiveness of which may be doubtful. 
 Security is the central tenant of pro-shackling contentions. Likely 
the most broadly accepted rationale for shackling practices is that they 
protect third parties—the public, health professionals, and guards—
from the woman when she is outside of the correctional facility for 
medical treatment.51 For example, when a woman is transported to the 
hospital to give birth, advocates would say shackling is necessary to 
ensure the safety of those with whom she may come in contact.52 Like-
wise, shackling and chaining pregnant women allegedly ensures that 
the woman will not escape, which would pose harm to society and the 
woman herself.53 To that end, shackling also allegedly protects the 
pregnant woman from harming herself. In essence, prison “adminis-
trators will not lose sight of the fact that some of the imprisoned 
women are dangerous criminals . . .,” which, to them, generally justi-
fies these practices.54  
                                                                                                                  
 49. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6. 
 50. An entirely separate discussion could be had on the history and locality of shackling 
practices. Briefly, are traditionally conservative institutes more apt to have these policies in 
place because they have historically minimized women’s rights; or, are they less likely to 
have these policies due to their strong opposition to abortion and support of fetal protection? 
See Amy E. Lerman & Joshua Page, The State of the Job: An Embedded Work Role Perspec-
tive on Prison Officer Attitudes, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 503, 509, 519 (2012). I would hy-
pothesize something towards the former because the discussion on shackling, for the most 
part, has focused on the mother and her rights. That is what sets this Note apart: its differ-
ential focus on the fetus rather than the mother. To that end, the states that received an F 
on their shackling “report card” in 2008 were Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Montana, and North Carolina. The Rebecca Project for Human Rights, Shackling 
Policies, in NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., MOTHERS BEHIND BARS, 19 (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/mothersbehindbars2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BXD5-D59M] [hereinafter Shackling Policies]. Or, is the prison industry a completely sepa-
rable group from its respective geographical states with its own ideals that support these 
practices? See Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 71, 118, 135 n.387 (2016). 
 51. See SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 6. 
 52. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 125 (“In September 2005, . . . a pregnant inmate 
in Wisconsin, was rushed to the hospital in handcuffs and leg shackles to have her labor 
induced . . . . [Her] restraints were left on even after the doctor ruptured her amniotic sac 
and asked her to pace the hallway for several hours to start the labor going.”); id. at 132. 
 53. E.g., Claire Louise Griggs, Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of Shack-
ling Pregnant Prisoners, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 250-51 (2011). 
 54. CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 34 (emphasis added). 
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1.   Current Policies on Shackling and Chaining  
 Until recently, neither federal nor state legislation was concerned 
with the physical well-being of imprisoned women.55 Since then, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) has promulgated restrictive policies 
on shackling practices; some states have enacted restrictive legisla-
tion; and organizations have set suggestive standards limiting the use 
of these restraints. This Sub-Section describes those efforts and ex-
pounds upon their effect. 
(a)   Federal Policy 
 In 2008, the FBP banned the “shackling of pregnant prisoners absent 
extenuating circumstances.”56 This federal policy change requires all 
states to “follow the same federal policies regarding incarcerated preg-
nant women.”57 The FBP’s report stated “that no restraints may be used 
on a pregnant prisoner unless there is a risk of escape or a threat that 
the prisoner will cause harm to herself or staff.”58 The FBP also allowed 
an exception for “extremely violent prisoner[s],” who may be restrained 
so long as the measures used are the least restrictive.59 The FBP also 
banned any use of control belts—“a device that administers an electrical 
shock when triggered”—on pregnant women.60 This federal legislation 
sends a strong message on the seriousness of shackling; however, the 
practical effectiveness of this federal legislation is minimal.61  
 Due to fundamental federalism concerns and the Tenth Amend-
ment, direct control of prison operations and policies is indefinitely lo-
calized.62 As an issue of health and safety, prison management and 
health concerns therein are a matter of state police power in which the 
federal government may not dip its toe.63 Likewise, the FBP legislation 
                                                                                                               
 55. See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 126. Generally, there is a lack of focus in legislation 
on the rights of the accused and incarcerated. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Criminal 
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give 
a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993) (arguing that 
this absence of legislation is a result of public choice theory). 
 56. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 125; accord FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE 
RESEARCH, supra note 6. 
 57. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 130. 
 58. Id. (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. This seems to reflect the strict scrutiny standard. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
 60. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 130 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ESCORTED TRIPS 13-14 
(2008), www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/bop_policy_escorted_trips_p5538_05.pdf). 
 61. See Leveille, supra note 29. 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. X; e.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 126; id. at 125 (“Although 
the passing of the new federal law is a step towards women gaining the rights they deserve, 
it remains vague and does little for the overall well being of pregnant women in prison.”). 
 63. Due Process of Law: Health, Safety, and Morals, JUSTIA, (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 
123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887)) http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/14-health-
mine-morals.html [https://perma.cc/9RQJ-XGB3]; see Melanie Kalmanson, Filling the Gap 
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practically “only applies [as binding authority] to prisons and deten-
tion centers operated by the federal government, and does not reach 
state and local facilities.”64 As a result, shackling policies and legisla-
tion differ from state-to-state.65 
(b)   State Legislation 
 Likely underlying the varying policies is each state’s theory of im-
prisonment, namely whether the focus should be punitive or rehabili-
tative.66 Shackling furthers penal goals but undermines rehabilitative 
goals. But, lack of transparency complicates any real analysis of local 
policies because the prison system and implementation of policies is 
localized to the point that determining exactly what happens ‘on the 
inside’ is almost impossible.67 Thus, state statutes are not completely 
indicative of what actually occurs inside correctional facilities—a sig-
nificant portion of which are privately operated.68 Nevertheless, this 
Section surveys existing state legislation. 
 In 2000, Illinois was the first state to act on the issue of shackling 
policies by enacting legislation, stating:  
Notwithstanding any other statute, directive, or administrative reg-
ulation, when a pregnant female prisoner is brought to a hospital 
from a County Department of Corrections facility for the purpose of 
delivering her baby, no handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any 
kind may be used during her transport to a medical facility for the 
purpose of delivering her baby. Under no circumstances may leg 
irons or shackles or waist shackles be used on any pregnant female 
prisoner who is in labor. Upon the pregnant female prisoner’s entry 
to the hospital delivery room, a county correctional officer must be 
posted immediately outside the delivery room. The Sheriff must pro-
vide for adequate personnel to monitor the pregnant female prisoner 
                                                                                                                  
of Domestic Violence Protection: Returning Human Rights to U.S. Victims, 43 FLA. ST. U.L. 
REV. 1359, 1381 n.186 (2016) (explaining the framework surrounding the Tenth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution in more depth). 
 64. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 10; accord Leveille, supra 
note 29. 
 65. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128; FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE 
RESEARCH, supra note 6. For a comprehensive look at state-by-state legislation, relative to 
other states, see Shackling Policies, supra note 50. 
 66. See generally, e.g., Sowle, supra note 18 (explaining these different rationales  
for punishment). 
 67. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128; Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59; Tracey L. Meares, 
Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Finan-
cial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 852-53 n.4 (1995); SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED 
WOMEN, supra note 5, at 13. 
 68. See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 128 (“Almost all states have general policies regard-
ing pregnant inmates, but those policies are not explicitly articulated in the law and can 
therefore be violated by corrections departments without many consequences.”). 
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during her transport to and from the hospital and during her stay 
at the hospital.69  
 In 2012, Florida enacted its Healthy Pregnancies for Incarcerated 
Women Act.70 This Act proscribes the use of restraints “on a prisoner 
who is known to be pregnant during labor, delivery, and postpartum 
recovery, unless the corrections official makes an individualized deter-
mination that the prisoner presents an extraordinary circumstance.”71 
Even in the excusable “extraordinary circumstance,” however, “leg, an-
kle, or waist restraints [cannot] be used on any pregnant prisoner who 
is in labor or delivery.”72 When the exception of “extraordinary circum-
stance[s]” is invoked, Florida requires that restraints be  
“applied . . . in the least restrictive manner necessary,” and the officer 
invoking the exception “shall make written findings . . . as to the ex-
traordinary circumstance that dictated the use of the restraints.”73 
Florida also requires that shackling policies be posted in correctional 
facilities so that inmates are aware of the practices.74 
 Minnesota is a state with a more rehabilitative focus,75 and its 
shackling policies seem to reflect such disposition. Minnesota’s statute 
is similar to Florida’s and provides an exception to its ban of restraints 
for specific circumstances and requires “the least restrictive [means] 
available and the most reasonable [restraints] under the circum-
stances” when the exception is invoked.76 It also seems to clarify, or 
expand upon, Florida’s vague “extraordinary circumstance” language, 
providing that “a woman known to be pregnant” cannot be restrained 
“unless the representative makes an individualized determination 
that restraints are reasonably necessary for the legitimate safety and 
security needs of the woman, correctional staff, other inmates, or the 
public.” 77 Note the consistency here with the policy rationales for these 
practices in general, i.e., protecting third parties who may come in con-
tact with the woman. Further, if the woman is in labor or has given 
                                                                                                               
 69. 1999 Ill. Laws 91-253 (effective Jan. 1, 2000); accord SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED 
WOMEN, supra note 5, at 10. 
 70. FLA. STAT. § 944.241(3)(a) (2015). 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). Note the knowledge requirement here, almost imposing a 
mens rea standard on the state, which creates an apparent excuse if the state somehow may 
claim it did not know the woman was pregnant. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 944.241(3)(b). 
 74. Id. § 944.241(5)(b). 
 75. See generally Lerman & Page, supra note 50 (comparing the theories of punishment 
of California and Minnesota by analyzing their policies and the attitudes of officers). 
 76. MINN. STAT. § 241.88(1)(a) (2015). 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
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birth within the preceding three days—referred to as postpartum—78 
Minnesota law provides that restraints may only be used if: 
(1) there is a substantial flight risk or some other extraordinary 
medical or security circumstance that dictates restraints be used to 
ensure the safety and security of the woman, the staff of the correc-
tional or medical facility, other inmates, or the public; 
(2) the [correctional facility] representative has made an individu-
alized determination that restrains are necessary to prevent escape 
or injury; 
(3) there is no objection from the treating medical care provider; and 
(4) the restrains used are the least restrictive type and are used in 
the least restrictive manner.79 
 Minnesota also addresses another aspect of shackling concerns that 
is seemingly absent from Florida’s statute: the transportation of preg-
nant inmates. Minnesota limits restraints during transportation, spe-
cifically prohibiting restraints that “cross or otherwise touch the 
woman’s abdomen” and any type of wrist restraint that is “affixed be-
hind the woman’s back.”80 Also, Minnesota goes further than Florida’s 
notice requirement and requires that facility staff be trained on these 
statutory provisions.81 
 As of August 2013, eighteen states had laws limiting the restraint 
of pregnant inmates; twenty-four states had less formal policies limit-
ing the restraint of pregnant inmates; and, eight states did not have 
any form of regulation on the restraint of pregnant inmates.82 
(c)   Organizational Standards 
 Shackling is also an organizational concern, and organizations like 
the American Bar Association (ABA) signal to the states by promul-
gating standards to suggest appropriate legislation or restrictions. The 
ABA weighed in on the shackling discussion, setting the following  
related standards: 
(a) A pregnant prisoner should receive necessary prenatal and post-
partum care and treatment, including an adequate diet, clothing, 
appropriate accommodations . . . , and childbirth and infant care 
education. Any restraints used on a pregnant prisoner or one who 
                                                                                                                  
 78. See supra note 45. 
 79. MINN. STAT. § 241.88(1)(c). 
 80. Id. § 241.88(1)(b). 
 81. Id. § 241.88(2). 
 82. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 10. This is a significant im-
provement from 2008, when forty-seven states had no legislation to restrict the practice of 
shackling pregnant women. Leveille, supra note 29. 
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has recently delivered a baby should be medically appropriate; cor-
rectional authorities should consult with health care staff to ensure 
that restraints do not compromise the pregnancy or the prisoner’s 
health. 
(b) . . . . A prisoner should not be restrained while she is in labor, 
including during transport, except in extraordinary circumstances 
after an individualized finding that security requires restraint, in 
which event correctional and health care staff should cooperate to 
use the least restrictive restraints necessary for security, which 
should not interfere with the prisoner’s labor. 
(c) Governmental authorities should facilitate access to abortion ser-
vices for a prisoner who decides to exercise her right to an abortion, 
as that right is defined by state and federal law . . . . 
. . . . 
(e) . . . . Governmental authorities should ordinarily allow a prisoner 
who gives birth while in a correctional facility or who already has 
an infant at the time she is admitted to a correctional facility to keep 
the infant with her for a reasonable time, preferably on extended 
furlough or in an appropriate community facility or, if that is not 
practicable or reasonable, in a nursery at a correctional facility that 
is staffed by qualified persons. Governmental authorities should 
provide appropriate health care to children in such facilities. 
(f) If long-term imprisonment is anticipated, a prisoner with an in-
fant should be helped to develop necessary plans for alternative care 
for the infant following the period described in subdivision (e) of this 
Standard, in coordination with social service agencies. A prisoner 
should be informed of the consequences for the prisoner’s parental 
rights of any arrangements contemplated. When a prisoner and in-
fant are separated, the prisoner should be provided with counseling 
and other mental health support.83 
These standards from the ABA seem to be the most protective, as com-
pared to the FBP’s policies and state legislation. First, the ABA starts 
with providing the inmate the option to terminate the pregnancy by 
directing access to abortion.84 Proceeding through gestation, the ABA’s 
standards restricting shackling or other physical restraints cover all 
three time periods—third trimester (albeit the entire pregnancy), la-
bor and delivery, and postpartum—and also explicitly provide for 
transportation during these times. The ABA standards also include a 
                                                                                                               
 83. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-6.9, at 
173-74 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/Treatment_ 
of_Prisoners.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QDS-FHBS] (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. § 23-6.9(c). 
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notice provision,85 like that in Florida’s statute.86 Most significantly, 
the ABA standards provide the most deference to medical profession-
als and direct the most restrictive usage of such restraints when the 
narrow exception for “extraordinary circumstances” is invoked.87 Fur-
ther, they recognize the importance of the postpartum period and di-
rect that the mother and infant not be separated “for a reasonable 
time.”88 These ABA-promulgated standards appear to be the most com-
prehensive step toward protecting incarcerated, pregnant females 
from the detrimental effects of shackling practices.89 
2.   Efforts to Reduce or Ban Shackling and Relevant Case Law 
 Likewise, the treatment of pregnant, incarcerated women in Amer-
ican correctional institutions has been recently contemplated by inter-
est group efforts, scholarship, and court actions. Current movements 
look to the following authorities to advocate for the repeal of shackling 
practices: international human rights standards, such as the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the U.S. Constitution, specifically 
the Eighth Amendment.90  
 The international human rights approach draws upon fundamental 
understandings of basic human rights, particularly the principles that 
(1) all humans, regardless of incarceration, must be treated with dig-
nity and respect and (2) torture or cruel punishment are prohibited.91 
These are the same arguments advanced against using torture in the 
War on Terror. Organizations like the International Human Rights 
Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School and the ACLU National 
Prison Project argue that shackling practices violate these inalienable 
human rights.92 The international human rights community recog-
nized this concern in 2006 when the Human Rights Committee (“Com-
mittee”) raised questions about reconciling shackling practices within 
the context of the guarantees of the ICCPR.93  
                                                                                                                  
 85. Id. § 23-6.9(f). 
 86. FLA. STAT. § 994.241(5) (2016). 
 87. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 83, § 23-6.9(b). 
 88. Id. § 23-6.9(e).  
 89. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 90. ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1; Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Shackling of Preg-
nant Prisoners in the United States, https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/page/shackling-pregnant-
prisoners-united-states [https://perma.cc/GFN6-A23G]. 
 91. See SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 1 (arguing that shack-
ling practices violate the ICCPR). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2. There was a follow-up to this initial concern in 2013. Id. at 3. 
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 Regardless of the legitimacy of this international human rights ar-
gument, achieving change via international authority is inherently dif-
ficult.94 The United States has a history of denying responsibility un-
der international norms in varying contexts or denying the authority 
of international documents.95 Likewise, the United States’ response to 
the Committee’s concerns has been to point to existing legislation—
federal and state—that conforms to the ICCPR.96 Existing legislation 
is incomplete, though. Some states completely lack legislation address-
ing these concerns. The goal should be to create uniform standards or 
legislation to ensure that all states are in conformance with the de-
mands of international human rights.97 
 The Eighth Amendment approach argues that shackling practices 
amount to “cruel and unusual punishment[].”98 These claims are re-
viewed under the “deliberate indifference” standard, which is com-
prised of conjunctive objective and subjective elements,99 whereby an 
official must demonstrate “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s seri-
ous illness or injury.”100 First, the objective element requires that “a 
detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that such a risk 
is one that society chooses not to tolerate.”101 In other words, if society 
feels sufficiently threatened by an unrestrained inmate, shackling is 
objectively justified. Next, the subjective element requires proving 
that the officer had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”102 
 In 2009, in Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services,103 the U.S. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vindicated this argument 
and held that shackling practices violate the Eighth Amendment.104 
There, the Plaintiff, who was pregnant while incarcerated for the non-
violent crime of credit fraud, was shackled to her wheel chair while 
                                                                                                               
 94. See generally, e.g., Kalmanson, supra note 63, at Section IV.A (discussing the strug-
gle of vindicating international authority within the context of protecting victims of domestic 
violence in the United States, despite international norms requiring such protection). 
 95. See Kalmanson, supra note 63, at Section IV.A (discussing the demeanor of the 
United States in the domestic violence context under the authority of the American Decla-
ration of Human Rights). 
 96. SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 3. 
 97. Cf. discussion supra Section II.B.1.b (explaining the state-specific nature of  
this legislation).  
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; SHACKLING OF INCARCERATED WOMEN, supra note 5, at 9. 
 99. Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Har-
rison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008)) (requiring that both the objective and subjec-
tive element be established before a violation is proven). 
 100. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation 
for medical malpractice). 
 101. Villegas, 709 F.3d at 569; accord id. at 568 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 
36 (1993)). 
 102. Id. at 569 (citing Harrison, 539 F.3d at 518); accord id. at 575-76. 
 103. 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 104. Id. at 534. 
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experiencing medical pains and then shackled to the bed during la-
bor.105 The Eighth Circuit found that the security officer imposing 
these restrictions acted with deliberate indifference (discussed below) 
in using these restraints, with the shackling amounting to a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.106 
 In 2013, in Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,107 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit again applied the “deliber-
ate indifference” standard, analyzing whether instances of shackling 
are unconstitutional.108 Though ultimately reversing summary judg-
ment for the Plaintiff (inmate) due to factual disputes,109 the Sixth Cir-
cuit established that “the shackling of pregnant detainees while in la-
bor offends contemporary standards of human decency such that the 
practice violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the ‘un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain’—i.e., it poses a substantial 
risk of serious harm.”110 The court made clear that “shackling women 
during labor runs afoul of the protections of the Eighth Amendment” 
of the U.S. Constitution.111 However, the Court observed that “the 
right to be free from shackling during labor is not unqualified.”112  
 The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed previously established exceptions to 
allow such ‘unconstitutional’ restraint when the pregnant inmate “pre-
sents a danger to herself or others,” or “poses a flight risk.”113 Essen-
tially, the Sixth Circuit, like the Eighth, vindicated the policy ration-
ales for shackling in the first place. The subjective element allowed the 
Court to excuse an officer for not removing restraints, despite a “no 
restraint order” from the hospital, because there was no proof that the 
officer himself was aware of the order.114  
 These practices and the remaining loopholes in the regulations 
show that even at her most tender and intimate life-stage—child 
birth—a woman is viewed and treated like a monster, or sub-human, 
in American institutions.115 Thus, these rulings that shackling violates 
the Eighth Amendment are practically weak and serve only to embellish 
                                                                                                                  
 105. Griggs, supra note 53, at 252. 
 106. Id. (citing Nelson, 583 F.3d at 522, 529). 
 107. 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 108. Id. at 571 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)). 
 109. Id. at 578. 
 110. Id. at 574 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. Note the parallel here to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), where the Court 
concluded that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but [such] right 
is not unqualified . . . .” 
 113. Villegas, 709 F.3d at 574. 
 114. Id. at 576. 
 115. See Lerman & Page, supra note 50, at 524. 
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the courts’ sympathy without actually effectuating protection for preg-
nant inmates. The issue remains that broad exceptions exist which offi-
cials may invoke with little to no oversight to allow shackling. 
III.   RECOGNIZING THE OTHER ENTITY: BANNING SHACKLING 
PRACTICES TO PROTECT THE FETUS AND THEN CHILD 
 Anti-shackling arguments, explained above, generally focus on the 
mother’s rights; if any discussion centers on the fetus or child, it is a 
general notion of the medical effects borne by the fetus or child as a 
result of the restraints. The rationale may be that a fetus does not have 
rights under the Constitution, and so it seems more obvious and ad-
vantageous to focus on the mother.116 Biologically inherent in this con-
versation, though often overlooked, is another human being: the child 
who enters the world at a time when shackling is still employed.117  
 What previous and developing arguments fail to adequately con-
sider is that shackling is increasingly problematic when the fetus be-
comes a child. To that end, in all time periods discussed here, the fetus 
is one that will be carried to term, thereby distinguishing this issue 
from abortion, through which the fetus will not be carried to term and 
does not reach the second point of the shackling discussion—labor and 
delivery. We know that this discussion is different based on prisons’ 
efforts to undermine female inmates’ access to abortion.118  
 This Part first explains the detrimental effects shackling has on the 
mother, the fetus, and the child. Section B then sets up the argument 
that banning shackling would protect the fetus—for which the state 
has accepted responsibility upon viability in the abortion context—and 
the child by discussing the state’s interests involved in shackling. Sec-
tion C bolsters the state’s interests against shackling by dispelling the 
purported safety policy justifications behind shackling. Assembling 
this discussion, Section D contends that shackling practices are uncon-
stitutional when viewed in light of the state’s interests in protecting 
potential fetal life—the full gestation of which is almost guaranteed in 
this context—and the child’s individual, untampered constitutional 
rights as a “person” under the U.S. Constitution, independent from its 
incarcerated mother.  
                                                                                                               
 116. But cf. Lachman, supra note 37 (explaining efforts in Alabama to recognize  
fetal interests). 
 117. Note this is distinguishable and non-transferable to abortion discourse wherein the 
fetus is never intended to be born and remains a fetus rather than a child. 
 118. See supra discussion Section II.A. 
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A.   Detrimental Effects of Shackling 
 “[T]he justifications for shackling pale in comparison to the severe 
damage and degradation it causes.”119 The effects of shackling on the 
mother are an obvious concern, especially considering that incarcer-
ated women are generally “treated less well than men while their gen-
der-specific needs have been ignored.”120 Few things are more gender 
specific than pregnancy and childbirth,121 not to mention the emotional 
intensity of the childbearing process, which is increased not only by 
incarceration but also the use of these barbaric devices.122 Shackling 
the mother during labor and delivery inherently complicates these in-
timate and life-changing processes and poses risk to the infant.123 
 Directly affecting the mother and the fetus, restraints interfere 
with the mother’s balance.124 When restrained, it is more likely that 
the mother will lose her balance and fall, risking injury to the fetus 
“because of [the mother’s] inability to catch herself” when hand-
cuffed.125 Florida’s statute directly addresses this concern, providing 
that “[i]f wrist restraints are used [in the third trimester], they must 
be applied in the front so the pregnant prisoner is able to protect her-
self in the event of a forward fall.”126 
 Inherent in the word “restraint” is the fact that using shackles, 
handcuffs, and chains on a pregnant woman during labor and delivery 
complicates these processes. Specifically, the woman’s movement is re-
stricted, lessening her ability to change positions as necessary.127 For 
example, in Nelson (the Eighth Circuit case discussed above), the 
mother/inmate “suffered a hip dislocation and an umbilical hernia di-
rectly resulting from the shackles that prevented” her from moving her 
legs.128 Medical personnel are also restricted in their access to the 
mother and fetus during delivery, which may jeopardize the safety of 
                                                                                                                  
 119. Griggs, supra note 53, at 251. 
 120. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 2, at 22. 
 121. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 122. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (“The mother who carries a child to full term is subject 
to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.”); Goldberg, supra note 
36, at 131 (“[T]rauma [is] caused by shackling a pregnant prisoner.”). 
 123. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 131 (quoting Assemblywoman Sally J. Leiber) (citing 
AMNESTY INT’L USA, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN). 
 124. E.g., Griggs, supra note 53, at 253. 
 125. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 131; accord Griggs, supra note 53, at 253. 
 126. FLA. STAT. § 944.241(3)(c)(2) (2015) (emphasis added). Minnesota’s statute also con-
siders this, just not as explicitly. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 127. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 131. 
 128. Griggs, supra note 53, at 253. For more information on an umbilical hernia, see 
Umbilical Hernia, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases- 
conditions/umbilical-hernia/basics/definition/con-20025630 [https://perma.cc/N2NK-5VBW]. 
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the child.129 Especially in an emergency situation, restricting medical 
personnel could cause physical harm to the child.130 In fact, even a mi-
nor delay could cause “permanent brain damage to the child.”131 
 In conclusion, the risks posed by using restraints on pregnant in-
mates outweigh any possible benefit these practices could serve. Spe-
cifically, these practices pose medical, physical, and emotional risks to 
the mother and fetus/infant/child. Thus, pregnancy is itself an extraor-
dinary circumstance that repudiates the use of shackles, handcuffs, or 
other restraints on pregnant inmates. 
B.   The State’s Interests 
 When considering almost any legislation, two sides are almost al-
ways involved. Here, the two interests to review are (1) the state’s in-
terests in enacting the legislation and (2) the interests of those affected 
by the legislation. This is the fundamental structure of American con-
stitutional law, regardless of the level of review being applied. With 
respect to shackling, when analyzing these interests, the focus has 
been on the woman—the state’s interest in protecting society from an 
inmate who may be dangerous, and the woman’s interest in maintain-
ing her bodily autonomy consistent with the right against cruel  
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and the  
Fourteenth Amendment.132  
 This discussion shifts the analysis to the fetus and child who is also 
affected by shackling practices. Directly transposing abortion jurispru-
dence shows that the state’s interests in protecting potential human 
life and fetal dignity are not unique to the abortion context and may 
be even stronger in this context where the state acts to essentially en-
sure that the fetus is delivered. Then, upon birth, the analysis shifts 
to view the interests in light of an innocent, newborn infant with un-
fettered rights, which the state has an interest in protecting. 
 Regarding an inmate’s ability to choose abortion, “the State has  
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in  
protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child.”133 How, 
then, can the state reject the same rights in the shackling context? 
This discussion does not contend that fetal rights should be recognized 
or constitutionalized, as that would significantly complicate women’s 
                                                                                                               
 129. Griggs, supra note 53, at 253; ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1, at *3. 
 130. ACLU BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 1. 
 131. Id. at *4.  
 132. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
 133. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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access to abortion.134 Rather, this discussion functions within the cur-
rent abortion framework that recognizes state interests in protecting 
fetal life, to a certain extent. Then, the focus shifts to the constitution-
ally protected citizen once the child is born. To contextualize this dis-
cussion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade stated: 
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like 
any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that 
insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest obviously ex-
tends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facil-
ities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate pro-
vision for any complication or emergency that might arise.135 
It goes without saying that there are glaring discrepancies be-
tween this language and what is happening to incarcerated 
women and the children born to them. This Section illustrates 
the state’s interests in shackling, first during gestation as it 
relates to potential fetal life, and second, after birth as it re-
lates to the child. 
1.   Protecting Fetal Health—A State Interest Vindicated by  
Abortion Law 
 The U.S. Supreme Court increasingly recognizes and upholds the 
state’s interests in protecting a fetus as gestation progresses.136 To that 
end, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Carhart, fifteen 
years after Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey,137 that regardless of “one’s views concerning the Casey joint opin-
ion, . . . a premise central to its conclusion [is clear]—. . . the govern-
ment has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and pro-
moting fetal life . . . .”138 To accomplish consistency in a world in which 
Casey and its progeny controls,139 the state must recognize that its in-
terests in “preserving and promoting fetal life” are not exclusive to the 
abortion context. No medical difference exists between a fetus being 
carried in the third trimester by a woman who is seeking an abortion 
and a fetus being carried in the third trimester whose mother plans to 
                                                                                                                  
 134. See generally Fiona de Londras, Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale 
from Ireland, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 243 (2015). 
 135. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (emphasis added). 
 136. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145-46 (2007); Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846. 
 137. 505 U.S. 833. 
 138. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145. 
 139. The “undue burden” standard from Casey is controlling is an even more concrete 
notion following the Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 
S. Ct. 2292 (2016), which despite its opportunity to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), and/or Casey, explicitly applied and thereby affirmed the standard from Casey. See 
also Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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give birth. If anything, the difference is that the latter will certainly 
be delivered. Thus, the state’s recognized interests in protecting fetal 
life must also apply when discussing incarcerated pregnancy. 
 Yet, such interests are directly contradicted by the enactment and 
implementation of shackling practices. Under the Casey “undue bur-
den” framework, the state emphasizes its interest in protecting both 
the mental health of the woman and the health of the fetus once it 
reaches viability.140 Viability is “the point at which a fetus could poten-
tially live outside the mother’s womb without medical aid.”141 Casey 
suggests that the state’s interests are valid before the child is born.142 
While this may differ from the wishes of some abortion advocates, for 
now, this is the current framework—women have the right to choose 
without any substantial obstacle until the state’s interests become sig-
nificant enough to be involved in the consideration.143 Living in the 
Casey framework, the state should not be allowed to abandon its re-
sponsibility to the fetus simply because the mother is incarcerated.  
 In sum, shackling incarcerated women undercuts the state’s pur-
ported interests in fetal wellbeing, the fundamental premise of the Ca-
sey “undue burden” framework. Though a woman—or anyone for that 
matter—loses civil liberties when imprisoned,144 such deprivation 
should not extend so far as to impede the medical interests of an inno-
cent child,145 which segues to the next Section discussing the child’s 
rights. In other words, “imprisonment . . . does not completely strip 
individuals [or their offspring] of their most basic constitutional and 
human rights.”146 
                                                                                                               
 140. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 141. MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 11 (2015). 
 142. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 143. See generally id. at 833. 
 144. Forman, Jr., supra note 33, at 27-29; Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59-60. 
 145. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).  
 146. Kasdan, supra note 4, at 59-60. 
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2.   Protecting the Child—A Constitutional “Person” 
 A significant event takes place when the fetus exits the womb and 
enters the world.147 “[W]hen a child draws his first breath, he [be-
comes] protected under the law”148 and the U.S. Constitution as a “per-
son” and U.S. citizen.149 This distinction is reflected in the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision Gonzales v. Carhart,150 where the Court de-
fined the specific point during birth at which the fetus has been par-
tially born and its death may then justify criminal liability.151 The 
state has an “interest and general obligation to protect life”152 and “re-
spect . . . the dignity of human life.”153 After birth, therefore, the state 
cannot infringe upon the child’s constitutional rights. Such rights, as 
characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court, are “virtually coextensive 
with that of an adult.”154  
 Even further distinguishing the child from its incarcerated mother is 
the reality that so many children born to incarcerated mothers are not 
parented by these mothers. In fact, “most babies [born to incarcerated 
women] are removed [from the mother] within 24 hours of birth.”155 
“Newborns are usually given to grandmothers or other family”156 or be-
come wards of the state and are either sent into foster care or adop-
tion.157 Therefore, the state’s interest in protecting a child born to an 
incarcerated mother is arguably stronger because the state will become 
the guardian of the child,158 as opposed to a child born to a ‘free’ mother 
                                                                                                                  
 147. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157; Collins, supra note 10, at 24 (“Abortion  
advocates . . . contend[] that life does not begin until birth.”). 
 148. Collins, supra note 10, at 24 (emphasis added). 
 149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) (stating that “person” within the Consti-
tution is applied “only postnatally”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 74 (1976). 
 150. 550 U.S. 124. 
 151. Id. at 147-48. Mens rea (or the subjective intent) for causing the death must also be 
proven to impose criminal liability. Id. at 148-49. 
 152. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. How life is defined is what affects abortion jurisprudence; 
however, here, life is non-debatable once the child is born. 
 153. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157. 
 154. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 155. FAMILY PLANNING & CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 6. 
 156. Id. 
 157. E.g., CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 43-44; RAM SUBRAMANIAN & ALISON SHAMES, 
VERA INST. JUST., SENTENCING AND PRISON PRACTICES IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 3, 16 (2013), https://storage.googleapis.com/ 
vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/sentencing-and-prison-practices-in-germany-and-
the-netherlands-implications-for-the-united-states/legacy_downloads/european-american-
prison-report-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3BS-F8TG]. 
 158. See Laura Oren, DeShaney’s Unfinished Business: The Foster Child’s Due Process 
Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV. 113, 116, 122-24 (1990) (explaining how the foster care sys-
tem allows the state to usurp the parent’s role). 
874  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:851 
  
who will raise the child on her own.159 With that, the interests of the 
child who will be permanently disconnected from its incarcerated 
mother become individually more significant. Switching to the state’s 
focus on the parents rather than the child: The child’s new parents—
foster, adoptive, or the state—have an interest in the child being taken 
care of, or protected, by the state until the child reaches their care.160 
C.   Empirically Dispelling Security Concerns—Escape, Harm to Her-
self, Harm to Others 
 The security rationales for shackling have been empirically refuted. 
First, women are primarily incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, such 
as drug use.161 So, women inmates generally do not have violent dispo-
sitions and have not shown a propensity for violence.162 In fact, some 
academics propose the exact opposite: that the prison population is 
comprised of victims rather than people who cause harm to others.163 
Thus, the idea that these women, especially when pregnant and near-
ing the most enduring part of their pregnancy, pose a risk to those 
around them is based on false pretenses. 
 Further, even if they were dangerous, these women, and inmates in 
general, do not enter medical facilities at their leisure. Shackling and 
chaining policies demonstrate this point in the extreme. Instead, in 
addition to physical restraints, inmates are usually escorted by officers 
who stay with the inmate throughout treatment.164 Thus, if a woman 
attempted to escape, despite the argument above, she would be 
stopped by the guard—rendering shackling/chaining essentially su-
perfluous and merely punitive, if anything. In states that have elimi-
nated or significantly limited shackling/chaining practices, no escapes 
of incarcerated, pregnant women have been reported.165  
 This is intuitively sound; a woman enduring child birth is unlikely 
to muster the energy or ability to escape a medical facility. Even if she 
could escape, why would she? She needs medical care to deliver her 
child and recover from child birth. Assumedly, a woman would not 
                                                                                                               
 159. Cf. Lachman, supra note 37 (explaining how Alabama basically used this interest 
as leverage to stop the incarcerated woman from having an abortion by moving to terminate 
her parental rights). 
 160. See Oren, supra note 158, at 116. 
 161. See CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 34. 
 162. See MARY BOSWORTH, ENGENDERING RESISTANCE: AGENCY AND POWER IN WOMEN’S 
PRISONS 56 (David Nelken ed., 1999); CHANDLER, supra note 6, at 34. 
 163. See id. at 56. 
 164. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ESCORTED TRIPS § 570.40 (2008) 
(stating that approved prisoners are generally transported for medical care). 
 165. Cf. SUBRAMANIAN & SHAMES, supra note 157, at 13 (reporting that only one percent of 
inmates who were given passes for visitation in Germany tried to abuse the privilege and escape). 
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think it is in the best interests of her child or herself to escape a med-
ical facility and confront the burden and risk of child birth alone. Fur-
ther, escaping prison is generally disadvantageous to the woman and 
almost always results in re-incarceration.166 Similarly, the idea that a 
woman poses a security risk to herself significantly lacks empirical 
support. In Florida, for example, there were only six suicides among 
incarcerated women—pregnant and non-pregnant—between 2000 and 
2015.167 For the same time period, there were 119 male suicides.168 
 Consolidating and contextualizing this disproval of security con-
cerns within a constitutional analysis, we see that shackling and 
chaining policies are unconstitutional. While the state’s security con-
cerns are barely valid, even with a valid security concern, the policies 
are not narrowly tailored to address these concerns.169 The next Sec-
tion discusses further the unconstitutionality of these policies within 
the context of the state’s interests in protecting fetal rights—as out-
lined in the abortion framework—and the child’s rights—as outlined 
by the Constitution and child custody laws. 
                                                                                                                  
 166. CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 79-80. 
 167. Inmate Mortality: Cause of Death by Gender 2000-2016, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/mortality/index.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). There was one 
female suicide in 2000, one in 2003, one in 2006, one in 2008, and there were two in 2009. Id. 
 168. Id. The gender populations for each year was as follows: 
 Men Women 
2015 93,032 7,018 
2014 93,792 7,150 
2013 93,813 7,071 
2012 93,579 6,948 
2011 95,139 7,180 
2010 95,088 7,144 
2009 93,857 7,037 
2008 91,304 6,888 
2007 86,294 6,550 
2006 82,360 6,216 
2005 79,221 5,680 
2004 76,675 5,299 
2003 72,520 4,796 
2002 69,164 4,389 
2001 67,762 4,245 
2000 67,214 4,019 
Inmate Population, Index to Statistics and Populations, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/ (assessing Departmental Annual Reports for FY 2015 through 
FY 2000) (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
 169. Cf. Griggs, supra note 53, at 261. 
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D.   Why Shackling the Mother Is Unconstitutional—The Child’s 
Rights and State’s Interest in Fetal Life 
 When a newborn is delivered, the child is no longer a fetus and be-
comes a ‘person’ of its own right to protection under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. With such embodiment comes civil liberties and undeniable hu-
man rights. Stated another way, the child is an individual separate 
from the mother with its own rights. The child custody context illus-
trates this principle, in which the system considers and compares the 
child’s rights juxtaposed with the parents’ rights. At times, infants, 
toddlers, and children of all ages are separated from their parents to 
protect the child’s interests;170 as mentioned above, such is the case for 
many children of incarcerated parents.171  
 Shackling supporters “argue that the shackling of women during 
labor is not inhumane because these women are prisoners.”172 No mat-
ter the crime for which the mother is sentenced, though, the child has 
not committed any crime.173 Thus, the rights of the newborn child must 
be protected, despite any loss of civil liberties by the mother174 via in-
carceration that may support the rhetoric for keeping shackling prac-
tices intact.175 This Section addresses the fetus’s and then the child’s 
rights throughout the most problematic periods in which female in-
mates are being restrained—the third trimester of pregnancy, labor 
and delivery, and postpartum recovery. Underlying this entire discus-
sion is the notion that the only pregnancies which are relevant here 
are those that will be carried to term—due either to the mother’s choice 
to have her child or her inability to access an abortion due to the prison 
facility’s control. This becomes the basis for the argument that shack-
ling is unconstitutional for reasons other than the rights of the mother 
and why states implementing or allowing shackling practices are ne-
glecting their interests assumed in other arenas, such as abortion.176 
Despite the fact that shackling practices have “been around for at least 
                                                                                                               
 170. See Melanie Kalmanson, Giving the Pawns a Voice: A Call for Mandatory  
Representation of Children in High-Conflict Custody Battles, 5 T. MARSHALL SCH. L.J. GENDER,  
RACE & JUST. 54, Part II (2015) (explaining the custody system’s focus on the child’s best interests). 
 171. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 172. Goldberg, supra note 36, at 132. 
 173. Supra note 145, 154 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
 175. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 158 (1973). 
 176. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (stating that the state has an “important and legitimate 
interest in potential life” at viability “because the fetus then presumably has the capability 
of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”). 
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a century[,] . . . the law on the shackling of pregnant women is under-
developed,”177 and history’s acceptance does not dictate that these mod-
ernly repulsive practices be allowed.178 
1.   Invoking Abortion Jurisprudence to Invalidate Shackling Dur-
ing the Third Trimester 
 The third trimester of a pregnancy includes weeks twenty-seven 
through forty of gestation.179 “Gestation” is “the development of a hu-
man embryo or fetus between fertilization and birth.”180 At thirty-eight 
weeks, “the fetus is considered full term.”181 The third trimester is sig-
nificant, especially within the context of the current abortion frame-
work, as the time-frame in which the fetus reaches viability.182 As ex-
plained above, viability is the point at which the state’s interests in 
fetal life become concrete and protectable by acceptable legislation. 
 In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court banned abortion during 
the third trimester (unless necessary for the mother’s health), finding 
that the state’s interests in protecting fetal life outweighed the 
mother’s privacy interests at that point.183 The Court stated: 
Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, bal-
anced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of 
the embryo or fetus not prevail.  
. . .  
In assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the 
less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the 
                                                                                                                  
 177. Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir. 2013). Nor is this 
a reason for the practice to stand. 
 178. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
 179. Fetal Development: Third Trimester, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, [hereinafter  
AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N], http://americanpregnancy.org/while-pregnant/third-trimester/ 
[https://perma.cc/3E95-L789] (defining the third trimester as starting at the twenty-seventh 
week); Fetal Development: The Third Trimester, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/in-depth/fetal-development/art-20045997 [https:// 
perma.cc/HPU9-YSPG]. Note, however, that Florida, for example, just redefined “[t]hird tri-
mester” to mean “the period of time from the beginning of the 24th week of gestation through 
birth.” FLA. STAT. § 390.011(12)(c) (2016) (Act became effective July 1, 2016). 
 180. FLA. STAT. § 390.011(6) (2016) (Act became effective July 1, 2016). 
 181. AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, supra note 179. 
 182. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (defining viability). 
 183. 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe 
v. Wade emphasized the doctor-patient relationship involved in abortion procedures to es-
tablish that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is within a woman’s right to privacy under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 
163. The physician-patient dynamic is also reflected in shackling policies, where legislation 
allows for physicians to affect whether restraints are used on the woman. The significance 
of this physician-patient relationship should also be further emphasized and respected in 
shackling policies. 
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State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant 
woman alone.184 
Doing away with the trimester framework from Roe, the U.S.  
Supreme Court nevertheless reaffirmed the state’s interest in  
protecting viable fetal life in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern  
Pennsylvania v. Casey.185  
 Accordingly, it is significant in the shackling context that third tri-
mester fetuses will be carried to term. Even if abortion jurisprudence 
were to change from the present standard to allow abortions up until 
birth, the state’s interests in protecting the fetus in the shackling con-
text are still arguably stronger. This is because, as previously dis-
cussed, inmates have limited access to abortion and, therefore, a gen-
eral obligation to carry the pregnancy to term. In other words, regard-
less of third trimester abortion jurisprudence, it is virtually guaran-
teed in the shackling context that potential life will become human 
life, barring any unexpected medical complications. 
 The central holding of Roe v. Wade,186 the governing framework of 
Casey,187 and the application of these in cases like Gonzales v. Car-
hart,188 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,189 and Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt190 remain valid.191 Gonzales v. Carhart seems to 
be substantially applicable in this context.192 There, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, relying partially on 
the brutality of the operation that would be allowed if the Court inval-
idated the Act.193 The Court further stated that Casey “confirms the 
State’s interest in promoting respect for human life at all stages in the 
pregnancy.”194 Therefore, the state may legitimately ban barbaric prac-
tices to further its interests in fetal life and the dignity thereof. Thus, 
the state has an interest in banning the use of shackling and other 
                                                                                                               
 184. Id. at 150. 
 185. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). The undue-burden standard from Casey was further af-
firmed in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309-10 (2016). 
 186. 410 U.S. at 153. 
 187. 505 U.S. 833; see supra note 137-146 and accompanying text. 
 188. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 189. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 190. 136 S. Ct. 2292. 
 191. Id. at 2300. 
 192. See generally 550 U.S. 124 (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003). 
 193. Id. at 160. 
 194. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). Whether the Carhart reasoning is sound within the 
context of the mother’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy is immaterial here be-
cause inmate pregnancies being discussed herein will not be aborted. Even if they were, the 
state’s interests would essentially be equal to those at play in abortion. 
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restraints during the third trimester of an incarcerated women’s preg-
nancy because it undermines the dignity and safety of fetal life after 
viability,195 as understood in current abortion jurisprudence. 
2.   Labor and Delivery 
 “Labor is the process by which the fetus and the placenta leave the 
uterus.”196 There are three stages of labor that may “begin weeks be-
fore a woman delivers her infant.”197 The final stage of labor “begins 
with the birth [of the infant] and ends with the completed delivery of 
the placenta and afterbirth.”198 This stage, thus, invokes the constitu-
tionally significant birth. As discussed above, the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits have determined that shackling practices during labor and 
delivery are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.199  
(a)   The Child’s Constitutional Rights 
 Aside from the empirical evidence undermining the Sixth Circuit’s 
recognition of the objective exceptions, what the Carhart Court fails to 
recognize is the other constitutionally protected, involved human 
whose rights are being violated. This Section explains how the infant’s 
constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment (Eighth 
Amendment) and guarantee of substantive due process (Fourteenth 
Amendment) are violated by shackling practices. 
 Beginning with the Eighth Amendment, regardless of the applica-
bility of any ‘exception,’ which is empirically rare,200 society does not 
tolerate harm to innocent infants. In fact, much of society—expressed 
vehemently by the pro-life movement—disavows negative treatment 
of a fetus, which is not even constitutionally protected. Relating back 
to the “deliberate indifference” standard applied in the Nelson and Vil-
legas cases explained above,201 there are two prongs to establish an 
Eighth Amendment violation. Subjectively, regardless of official no-
tice, the harm being caused, or the significantly increased likelihood of 
harm, to an infant born by a restrained mother seems quite apparent. 
                                                                                                                  
 195. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (defining viability).  
 196. What is Labor?, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NAT’L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & HUM. 
DEV., https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pregnancy/conditioninfo/pages/labor.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Z6SE-YV53]. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text discussing Nelson v. Correctional 
Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009), and Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 200. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
 201. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text discussing Nelson, 583 F.3d 522, 
and Villegas, 709 F.3d 563. 
880  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:851 
  
So, official notice seems unnecessary. In all, there is a per se Eighth 
Amendment violation by subjecting an innocent—therefore undeserv-
ing of punishment—infant to the harm of shackling practices during 
labor and delivery.202 
 Further, subjecting these infants to restraints by and through the 
mother intrudes upon the child’s due process right to safety, bodily au-
tonomy, etc. These rights are especially implicated since the restraints 
are being placed by the state on the infant’s mother, who is confined 
by the state.203 Thus, governmental action is much more directly in-
volved here than in cases where due process claims have been denied 
for lack of state action, such as DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services,204 where the plaintiff’s due process claim 
against the child protective services agency for failing to adequately 
protect his safety was denied because the abuse was perpetrated by a 
private actor, the plaintiff’s father.205 Under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, “[t]he [S]tate (by its own acts) may not 
deprive an individual of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law.”206 Children, as constitutionally protected persons,207 have “sub-
stantive rights to safety and freedom from undue restraint,”208 which 
are therefore violated when the state imposes shackling practices on 
the child’s mother during labor and delivery, subjecting the child to 
substantial harm. Thus, shackling practices are unconstitutional be-
cause they violate the child’s due process rights. 
(b)   Statutory Analysis of the Child’s Best Interests  
 When a court must determine which parent is the most suitable to 
care for a child in a custody dispute, its analysis centers around the 
child’s best interests.209 Best interests statutes “usually present sev-
eral factors which are considered to directly correlate with the ‘child’s 
physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.’ Courts are to 
analyze the unique facts of each case within the framework of such 
factors to determine the most favorable corresponding custody ar-
rangement.”210 These factors also shed light on the shackling discus-
sion, which directly implicates the child’s best interests. 
                                                                                                               
 202. Cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
 203. See Oren, supra note 158, at 128. 
 204. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 205. See generally id. at 189. 
 206. Oren, supra note 158, at 129. 
 207. See id. at 139 (stating that children have equal rights to adults in another context). 
 208. Id. at 137. 
 209. Kalmanson, supra note 170, at Part II (explaining the current custody structure in depth). 
 210. Id. at 57 (quoting S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)) (citations 
omitted); accord, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2015). 
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 In this context, a few best interest factors are especially relevant.211 
For example, “[t]he moral fitness of the parents”212 and “[t]he mental 
and physical health of the parents”213 are both best interests factors, 
meaning that these parental statuses affect the adult’s ability to par-
ent the child.214 In that sense, due to the detrimental effects of shack-
ling practices on the mother’s health—physically and emotionally—
shackling practices directly undermine these two best interests factors 
by lessening the mother’s “moral fitness” and “mental and physical 
health,” which contribute to her parenting.  
 Further, “[t]he developmental stages and needs of the child and the 
demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to meet the 
child’s developmental needs,” another factor in the best interests anal-
ysis,215 would be complicated with a child who is a victim of shackling 
practices. This interest is completely independent of the mother and 
the effect shackling may have on her well-being. In other words, by 
implementing shackling practices, the state undermines this best in-
terest factor regardless of the mother’s actions. 
3.   Postpartum 
 Despite being distinct legal entities, the time immediately following 
birth—known as postpartum—is critical for the infant’s development 
and the mother’s recovery.216 Today, “[m]others and babies are no 
longer separated almost immediately after birth.”217 Restraining a 
woman or removing the child from her undermines the child’s ability 
to bond with its mother, or at least reap the biological benefits from 
this postpartum period. This is especially important when the child 
will not be put into adoption or foster care and will eventually be raised 
by its biological mother following her incarceration. Even when the in-
mate will not raise the child, though, there are benefits that the bio-
logical mother may provide to the baby immediately following birth. 
Considering the significance that the postpartum period has for the 
child’s development, restraints should also be eliminated during this 
time to allow the mother’s full recovery, which will, in the long term, 
                                                                                                                  
 211. Drawn from Florida’s best interests statutory factors, for example. 
 212. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(f). 
 213. Id. § 61.13(3)(g). 
 214. Obviously, the fact of incarceration would militate against the mother having cus-
tody of the child; however, for this analysis, it is considered for the longevity of the parent-
child relationship, continuing after incarceration. 
 215. Id. § 61.13(3)(s). 
 216. SUBRAMANIAN & SHAMES, supra note157, at 12. 
 217. Mary M. Murry, Labor and Delivery: Then vs. Now, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/expert-blog/labor-and- 
delivery-than-and-now/bgp-20090302. 
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benefit the child by maintaining and preserving the mother’s physical and 
emotional well-being and allowing the necessary biological development. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 A newborn is minutes old; its entire life lies ahead. Such life can ei-
ther be cloaked in innocence, as the “ ‘axiomatic and elementary’ princi-
ple whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of 
our criminal law’ ” would suggest;218 or, it can be immediately tainted 
with an environment of unnecessary punishment, likely imposing phys-
ical and emotional difficulties. Fetal life, or the state’s interests in pro-
tecting the same, and the subsequent, more substantial, interests of the 
child born to an incarcerated woman render unconstitutional shackling 
and other restraints of pregnant, incarcerated women.  
 Current shackling discourse generally underemphasizes these in-
terests, which are supplemented by both the mother’s and the child’s 
human rights to dignity, respect, and protection against cruel and un-
usual punishment. This Note brings those interests, unfettered by in-
carceration, to the forefront, presenting a likely more universally ac-
ceptable rationale for following the precedent set by the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons and American Bar Association for severely restricting 
the use of physical restraints on pregnant inmates in American correc-
tional facilities to protect the resulting children.219 
                                                                                                               
 218. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 
432, 453 (1895)). 
 219. Recognizing the effects shackling practices have on both incarcerated women and 
the children they bear unveils a significant need for uniformity in anti-shackling legislation. 
Across-the-board legislation is the first step. State-wide legislation can only ensure protec-
tion to a certain extent due to the localization of prison management. Enforcement of restric-
tive legislation, including oversight at the local level, is the ultimate end-goal to ensure that 
pregnant inmates and their children are protected. 
